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Motivated by the accession of new member states into the European Union,
this paper examines the appeal of taking part in a large monetary union from
the perspective of small open economies. Consistent with existing ﬁndings in
the literature, we show that in the absence of ﬁscal policy considerations, tak-
ing part in a large monetary union is counterproductive for a small economy.
Nevertheless, once the role of ﬁscal policy is properly incorporated, taking part
in the monetary union becomes desirable from a social perspective. Following
these results, we explore the prospects of engaging both economies in ﬁscal co-
ordination and on how diﬀerent schemes of policy synchronization can provide
the grounds to make cooperation beneﬁcial for the members of a monetary
union. We ﬁnd that when monetary and ﬁscal authorities cooperate and at-
tempt to exploit externalities for their own beneﬁt, a Pareto eﬃcient outcome
c a nb ea c h i e v e di fﬁscal policy in the monetary union is coordinated by a central
authority and such authority acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-` a-vis the central
bank. Our analysis suggests that this regime result superior to (i) a monetary
u n i o ni nw h i c hﬁscal authorities conduct their policy in an independent or (ii)
coordinated fashion, (iii) to a regime where both authorities internalize the
eﬀects of their own externalities by allowing the central bank to act as Stackel-
berg leader and (iv) event to a regime in which the small open economy decides
to stay out of the monetary union.
Key words: Common central bank; policy coordination; monetary union,
monetary leadership, ﬁscal leadership
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E58, E61, F15
∗Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York,
YO10 5DD, UK; E-mail: rct102@york.ac.uk. I would like to thank Gulcin
Ozkan, Luis Gonz´ alez-Morales, Herb Newhouse and participants at the Uni-
versity of York Research Student Workshops and MMF Research Group 34th
Annual Conference for their valuable comments. Any remaining errors are
my own.
11 Introduction
By admitting ten new members in 2004, the European Union (EU) undertook the
largest expansion in its history. Following their accession into the EU, new member
states (NMSs: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuanian,
Latvia, Estonian, Cyprus and Malta) are expected to meet the Maastricht criteria in
order to join the euro area in the near future. The likely inclusion of these countries
into the European Monetary Union (EMU) may entail substantial beneﬁts for them
in terms of lower transaction costs, exchange rate volatility removal, price stability,
higher output growth and decline in country risk.
Nevertheless, joining the EMU may also entail some costs for the NMSs in terms
of macroeconomic stabilization. By entering into the EMU, NMSs would automati-
cally surrender their monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB) and be
constrained by the ﬁscal rules imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).1
Providing that the SGP requires member states to aim for public budget balances
which are close to equilibrium or in surplus in the medium term, the allocation of
taxes and public expenditure would remain the only instruments in the control of
EMU members to stabilize their economies against real shocks.
Prior to the formation of the EMU, the impact of asymmetric shocks and the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to respond to them was one of the main concerns of
the literature assessing the viability of a common European currency. Since the com-
pletion of EMU, however, a large amount of literature has been devoted to exploring
the implications of ﬁscal policy on macroeconomic stabilization. Yet, most of those
studies which have integrated ﬁscal stances into the analysis of EMU policies assume
that the economies involved are structurally symmetric.
Notably, the diﬀerence between the size of the ten NMS listed above and those
that shaped EMU in the ﬁrst stage is signiﬁcant and their size in relation to the size
of EMU is considerably smaller. In fact, any country that decides to join EMU at
this stage, including the United Kingdom, will face not only a similar asymmetric
position but also the same monetary and ﬁscal constraints as the NMS. Therefore,
the use of ﬁscal policy towards stabilization seems to be an important matter for
those countries that eventually will decide to participate in EMU.
Taking into account the presence of size asymmetries and the role of ﬁscal policy on
macroeconomic stabilization, this paper attempts to shed some light on two particular
questions. The ﬁrst is whether participating in a monetary union is desirable for
small open economies. From a monetary policymaking perspective, the adoption
of a common currency in the presence of size asymmetries has been addressed by
Martin (1995) who employs a three-country model of policy coordination to analyse
the possibility of forming EMU in two stages. He ﬁnds that those small countries
that decide to stay out of EMU in a ﬁrst stage would be able to free-ride from it by
employing their own monetary policy and therefore would choose to stay out of the
1Non-EMU members are also constrained by SGP rules but are not subject to enhanced ﬁscal
surveillance or economic sanctions.
2union permanently. Although our model is diﬀerent, the argument about the free-
riding opportunities of small open economies employed here is similar to Martin’s but
we extend it to introduce “representative” ﬁscal authorities that maximize society’s
welfare and intervene on stabilization. The second question this chapter attempts to
answer is whether ﬁscal coordination is beneﬁcial or counterproductive for those small
open economies that surrender their monetary policy to a central authority. Beetsma
et al. (2001) address this second question using a symmetric two-country model and
ﬁnd that ex-ante coordination between monetary and ﬁscal authorities is desirable.
Here we explore that issue from the perspective of a small economy employing a
benchmark case in which the economies involved conduct their own monetary and
ﬁscal policies in a non-cooperative fashion.
In assessing the viability of taking part in a monetary union, we ﬁrst concentrate
our attention on the monetary policymaking process. We show that, in the absence
of ﬁscal policy considerations, participating in a monetary union results in a coun-
terproductive strategy for a small economy whose only policymaker is exclusively
concerned about inﬂation and employment. Secondly, we consider the interactions
between ﬁscal and monetary authorities on macroeconomic stabilization. We ﬁnd
that the inclusion of ﬁscal authorities that maximizes society’s welfare introduces
new spillovers and conﬂicts between them and the monetary policymakers. Once ﬁs-
cal authorities are properly incorporated, taking part in the monetary union becomes
desirable from a social perspective. Finally, we focus our attention on the viability
of engaging both economies in ﬁscal coordination and on how diﬀerent schemes of
policy synchronization can provide the grounds to make cooperation beneﬁcial for
the members of a monetary union. We observe that the pure coordination of ﬁscal
authorities–playing Nash against the central monetary authority–results a counter-
productive strategy for the society. We also ﬁnd that, while a monetary leadership
strategy results in a deterioration of the small economy ﬁscal authority’s position, a
ﬁscal leadership strategy leads to a Pareto improvement.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The following section reviews
brieﬂy some recent literature on ﬁscal policy coordination in EMU. Section 3 presents
the two-country model employed in this chapter, the reduced forms of the model
a n da na n a l y s i so ft h ei n ﬂation employment trade-oﬀs faced by monetary and ﬁscal
authorities under the two main regimes considered. The assessment of inﬂation—
employment trade-oﬀs explains the intuition behind the free-riding opportunities en-
joyed by the authorities of small economies when they operate under non-cooperative
regimes. Section 4 assesses the viability of forming a monetary union in the absence
of ﬁscal policy consideration. Section 5 introduces ﬁscal authorities that maximize
society’s welfare and reconsiders the feasibility of forming a monetary union between
a small and a large economy. Once the convenience of participating in a monetary
union has been reassessed in the presence of non-cooperative ﬁscal stances, this sec-
tion also examines the viability of engaging both economies in ﬁscal coordination by
evaluating three diﬀerent schemes of ﬁscal cooperation: simple coordination of ﬁscal
policymakers playing Nash against the monetary authority, monetary and ﬁscal lead-
3ership. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main conclusion and implications of this
chapter.
2 Fiscal policy coordination in EMU
Two strands of literature have addressed the impact of ﬁscal and monetary policy
coordination on the stabilization policies of a monetary union. The ﬁrst assumes iden-
tical economic structures in modelling macroeconomic policymaking and the second
implicitly or explicitly uses asymmetric features.
In the ﬁrst strand of literature, Cooper and Kempf (2004) employ a multi-country
overlapping generations model to assess the welfare eﬀects of monetary and ﬁscal
policy interactions in a monetary union. They observe that in the absence of ﬁscal
policy considerations, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank might be
costly and only if shocks across the countries are suﬃciently positively correlated
does the monetary union regime increase welfare. Although Cooper and Kempf do
not address the issue of ﬁscal coordination per se, they ﬁnd that the inclusion of ﬁscal
intervention by national governments, combined with a central monetary authority
that has the ability to commit to its policy, reverses this result. In that scenario,
joining a monetary union improves welfare regardless of the degree of correlation of
the shocks.
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) also consider a model with n countries participat-
ing in a monetary union and in which monetary and ﬁscal authorities have diﬀerent
targets for output and inﬂation. They deal explicitly with ﬁscal and monetary coordi-
nation and ﬁnd that leadership by any of the two authority produces better inﬂation
and output outcomes than a discretionary Nash equilibrium. Using the same model,
Dixit and Lambertini (2003) observe that, if authorities agree on the ideal levels of
output and inﬂation, the desired targets can be achieved even if there is disagreement
about the relative importance of the two goals, regardless of which authority moves
ﬁrst and despite the lack of cooperation among the policymakers. With this, they
suggest that it is more important for EMU members to reach consensus on their
policy objectives than to achieve commitment among their authorities.
Using a simpler framework, Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) consider an aggregate-
demand—aggregate-supply closed economy model in which ﬁscal and monetary poli-
cymakers’ main concern is to minimize the deviations of output and inﬂation from
their commonly agreed targets. Consistent with Dixit and Lambertini (2001), their
analysis of alternative regimes suggests that both ﬁscal and monetary authorities
prefer the outcome of a Stackelberg to that of a Nash game, independently of whom
is the leader. However, they also notice that the nature of the game authorities play
is such that each player prefers to be the follower than the leader. Finally, Beetsma
et al. (2001) also analyse the desirability of monetary and ﬁscal policy coordination
in a two-country model in which monetary and ﬁscal authorities have diﬀerent ob-
jectives. They ﬁnd that ﬁscal coordination might be counterproductive because of
4the adverse reaction of the monetary authority to the ﬁscal authorities coordinated
eﬀorts but also that ex-ante coordination is desirable when it gives a ﬁrst mover
advantage strategic position to the ﬁscal authorities.
Literature using implicit or explicit asymmetric structures is less abundant. Levine
and Pearlman (2001) analyse the conduct of ﬁscal and monetary policy in a multi-
country setup where all the economies have identical economic structures. A group
of “ins” forms a monetary union and a group of “outs” retain monetary sovereignty.
Consistent with Martin (1995) they ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant incentives for coun-
tries to decide individually not to join EMU and free-ride from the beneﬁts that
staying out of the monetary union provides. In their analysis, asymmetric features
implicitly arise when ﬁscal authorities pertaining to a monetary union form coalitions
to cooperate on stabilization. They ﬁnd that, joining can be convenient only if the
“ins” conduct their own ﬁscal policy in a coordinated fashion; when this happens a
large monetary union becomes feasible. Engwerda et al. (2002) introduce asymmetric
features in a more explicit form. They employ a two-country dynamic model with
asymmetries in the authorities’ preferences, some of the model structural parameters
and on the bargaining power of the policymakers in collective decisions. In this way,
they ﬁnd that cooperation is often eﬃcient for ﬁscal players but results in consider-
able losses for the central monetary authority. In the absence of asymmetries, ﬁscal
players’ cooperation leads in most of their simulations to a Pareto improvement for
them but not for the central monetary authority.
Per se, the importance of ﬁscal policy for the stabilization of small economies
participating in a monetary union appears to have received little or no attention in
the literature. This issue, however, becomes especially relevant with the accession
of NMSs to the EU and their imminent entrance into EMU. Notably, the diﬀerence
between the size of the NMSs and those that shaped EMU in the ﬁrst stage is sig-
niﬁcant. Table 1 illustrates the nature of some of those asymmetries by comparing
the GDP size and trade openness of the new members against that of their EU and
prospective EMU partners prior to their accession.
As can be observed, roughly speaking the new members’ output represent less than
ten percent of the EMU GDP; Poland being the largest with almost half of that share.
Another interesting feature that emerges from Table 1 is the high openness to trade
of NMS with the rest of the world and speciﬁcally towards the EU. By 2003, prior to
their accession, most NMS showed total trade-to-GDP ratios and trade integration
shares with the EU above those observed in the 12 EMU members and well over those
of their four largest EU partners.
It is well documented that the smaller size and openness of an economy operating
under non-cooperative exchange rate regimes provides its policymakers with an ad-
vantageous position to stabilize their economies in the presence of real shocks (see for
instance Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1998; Martin, 1995, 1998; Ghironi and Giavazzi,
1998; Eichengreen and Ghironi, 2002). In our view, the loss of monetary policy inde-
pendence and the constraints imposed on ﬁscal policy by the SGP rules will certainly
reduce the capacity of small economies to take advantage of their size to respond
5Table 1: New EU members size and trade comparison
Member
State Total¹ % EU  Exports  Imports Export Import
Poland 374 4.19 0.29 0.32 53.4 48.9
Czech Rep. 149.4 1.67 0.54 0.57 74.9 56.6
Hungary 130.5 1.46 0.52 0.56 58.0 48.8
Slovak Rep. 59.9 0.67 0.67 0.69 73.8 58.3
Lithuania 33.7 0.38 0.42 0.51 48.1 29.8
Slovenia 32.6 0.37 0.46 0.49 45.6 62.8
Latvia 20.3 0.23 0.29 0.47 53.3 49.8
Estonia 14 0.16 0.50 0.68 54.2 34.7
Cyprus 12.6 0.14 0.07 0.31 49 26.9
Malta 6.2 0.07 0.52 0.67 25.9 44.1
EU 15 8,921.6 0.34 0.33
EMU 12 7,052.7 0.36 0.35
NMS 10 833.3 9.34 0.43 0.53 53.6 46.1
Germany 1,932.5 21.7 0.31 0.25 47.9 38.9
UK 1,508.9 16.9 0.17 0.21 47.8 37.5
France 1,454.5 16.3 0.21 0.20 50.4 55.3
Italy 1,311.2 14.7 0.20 0.19 40.1 48.7
Source: Eurostat, with information for 2003 and CIA world factbook.
¹ Figures in billions of euros. 
² Figures are underestimated due to unreported small flows by the second source.
Domestic GDP Trade-to-GDP EU Trade (%)²
eﬀectively to economic disturbances. Following this argument, in this chapter we
re-examine the issue of economic size asymmetries considering the interdependence
of ﬁscal and monetary policy inside a monetary union.
3 The model
The basic model we employ is based on Canzoneri and Henderson’s (1991) two-
country model. Asymmetric features are adopted from Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998)
and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) who have used this model to analyse the optimal
size of a currency union and the case for transatlantic policy coordination between the
US and Europe. In order to introduce ﬁscal policy considerations into the analysis,
we follow Jensen (1991), Pizzati (2001) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002).
3.1 General framework
In the model, all variables are expressed in logarithms except for the interest rate.
Each economy specializes in the production of one particular good. Aggregate sup-
plies in both economies are increasing functions of the employment rate (nj)a n d
6decreasing functions of a productivity disturbance x:
y
j =( 1− α)n
j − x (1)
where 0 <α<1a n dj = h,f.T h e s u p e r s c r i p th denotes the variables of a small
home economy an f those of a large foreign economy (e.g. an already formed mone-
tary union). For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the elasticity of output
with respect to employment, α, is the same for both economies.
Total labour demand in each economy is determined by proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
for which labor demand is complete when the marginal productivity of labour is equal





j − x (2)
where τj, wj, and pj are, respectively, the rate of taxation of revenues, the nominal
wage rate and the price of the good produce by economy j.
Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) are weighted averages of the prices of domestic and
foreign goods. Residents in the home economy spend a fraction (1−β) of their income
on domestic goods and a fraction β on goods produced in the foreign economy. On
the other hand, consumers in the foreign economy spend a fraction β of their income
on their own goods and a fraction (1 −β) on goods produced on the home economy.
The CPIs are then described by
q






f +( 1− β)(p
h − e)=p
f − (1 − β)z (3)
where qh and qf denote the CPIs of the home and the foreign economies, and e and
z = e + pf − ph are, respectively, the nominal and real exchange rates.
In (3), β is an indicator of the relative size of the two economies and of their
integration toward each other. Notice that when β = 1
2 the two economies are
identical. As β rises the size of the home economy shrinks while that of the foreign
economy increases. In the extreme case in which β = 1, the home economy is so
small that it is not able to aﬀect the foreign economy CPI at all.
Demand is positively inﬂuenced by the output of both economies according to
the proportion of income they allocate to domestic and foreign-produced goods. The
marginal propensity to spend ε is the same for both goods and in both economies.
Demand is also favourably aﬀected by the two governments’ spending on domestic
and foreign goods. Residents in the two economies reduce expenditure by the same
amount (0 <v<1) after an increase in the real interest rate rj.T h e m a r k e t
equilibrium conditions for the two economies are given by
y
h = δβz + ε
£
βy










f = −δ(1 − β)z + ε
£
βy









7Clearly, a depreciation of the real exchange rate shifts demand away from the foreign
toward the home economy. Notice that when, for instance, β = 1 the real exchange
rate does not aﬀect the foreign economy at all.
Ap r i o r i , the ex ante real interest rate in each economy is deﬁned as the nominal







where ij the nominal interest rate in economy j.
Each economy issues bonds denominated in domestic currency which investors
regard as perfect substitutes. They hold positive amounts of both kind of bonds
when expected interest rates measured in a common currency are equal to
i
f = i
h − E(e+1)+e (6)






where λ>0a n dmj represents the nominal money supply in economy j.








Employment rises with increases in money supply and decreases with higher wage
rates and taxes. In (8), the nominal interest rate has a positive eﬀect on employment.
At the end of period t − 1, trade unions set the nominal wage rate prevailing
in period t. Their purpose is to minimize the expected deviations of employment









Substituting (8) into (9) and minimizing with respect to nj, we obtain the nominal
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Trade unions set nominal wages according to the expected stances of monetary and
ﬁscal policymakers in period t and the eﬀect of those stances on the domestic interest
rate.
In order to focus our attention on the role of strategic interactions between the
two economies and on the importance of size asymmetries for the choice of the most
appropriate exchange rate regime, we neglect the time inconsistency problems that
might arise between the trade unions and the monetary and ﬁscal authorities in each
8economy.2 Since shocks are random and non-observable by unions at period t−1, in
the absence of time inconsistency problems expected money supplies and taxes are
equal to zero. Hence, the rational decision for trade unions is to set wages equal to
zero, wj =0 .3
Finally, with no time inconsistency problems, the government budget constraint
abstracts from seigniorage as a possible source of revenue. Fiscal authorities face a




Since our framework is static, we assume that the ﬁscal authorities cannot issue debt
either and consequently are subject to a balanced budget constraint.4
3.2 Policymakers’ preferences
The money supply is the only instrument that monetary authorities possess. They
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The monetary authorities’ losses increase with deviations of employment from zero
and positive changes in their CPIs. The parameter σ1 reﬂe c t st h ew e i g h tt h a tp o l i -
cymakers attach to employment and inﬂation deviations from their targets of zero.
In the event that the home and the foreign economies decide to constitute a mon-
etary union, a single central authority minimizes the weighted sum of both economies
losses as given by
LMU = βL
f
CB +( 1− β)L
h
CB (13)
For simplicity, we assume that the weight of each economy on the central authority’s
decisions is proportional to its size in the monetary union.5
Fiscal authorities’ only policy instrument is the rate of taxation of revenues; hence,
government spending is obtained residually. In addition to unemployment and inﬂa-
tion, ﬁscal authorities dislike the volatility of taxation and the exchange rate. Fiscal
authorities care about exchange rate volatility because of the cost it brings on so-
2This is not unrealistic providing that the Maastricht Treaty prevents in principle the inﬂationary
bias by stipulating that one year before joining EMU, the accession country’s inﬂation rate should
n o te x c e e db ym o r et h a n1 . 5 %t h ea v e r a g er a t eo ft h et h r e eE Uc o u n t r i e sw h e r ei n ﬂation is the
lowest.
3Interest rates in (8) also depend on shocks and on the stances of monetary and ﬁscal authorities.
4Consistently with SGP requirements, in our model ﬁscal deﬁcits in both economies equal zero
over time.
5Considering the present size of EMU, this assumption is to some extent consistent with the
current voting system of “one country one vote” and with the new proposed system of rotating
groups in which larger countries have more power in the European Central Bank’s monetary policy
decisions and which will replace the former voting system as soon as the number of member states
in EMU exceeds 15 (European Council, 2003).
9ciety’s welfare in terms of uncertainty and transaction costs and they dislike the
volatility of taxation due to the distortions it imposes on society. Thus, each ﬁscal
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where χj is the cost that the volatility of the exchange rate imposes on society’s
welfare in economy j, σ2,j represents the relative dislike of the ﬁscal authorities
for the volatility of taxation and the nominal exchange rate, and σ3 measures their
relative dislike for employment and inﬂation.
An important point to notice in equation (14) is the j subscript in σ2,j.T h i s
suggests that, according to their relative size and integration with one another, the
two economies’ dislike for the volatility of taxation and the exchange rate may diﬀer.
As β → 1, the home economy becomes not only smaller but also more and more
integrated to the foreign; hence, the weight that the home ﬁscal authority attaches
to the exchange rate volatility also increases. Notice that the larger aversion of the
small economy for exchange rate volatility raises its activism in ﬁscal policymaking
(i.e. it reduces its dislike for the volatility of taxation).
In the event that the two economies form a single currency union, the nominal
exchange rate volatility is not a concern for their residents anymore (i.e. σ2,j =0 ) .
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where σ3 measures the relative aversion of the ﬁscal authorities for employment and
inﬂation relative to taxation volatility.
3.3 Reduced forms
In this section, we express the employment and inﬂation endogenous variables of
the model in terms of exogenous, predetermined or control variables for the non-
cooperative and monetary union regimes.
3.3.1 Non-cooperative (ﬂexible exchange rates) regime
In the absence of cooperation, each economy posses its own currency and conducts
its macroeconomic policy independently. Fiscal and monetary policymakers in both
economies chose their instruments by playing Nash against each other.
Since the algebra to solve the reduced forms for employment and inﬂation under
ﬂexible exchange rates is cumbersome, we present the derivations of those expressions
in Appendix A.1. In compact notation and leaving the size parameters (β and (1−β))
10Table 2: Non-structural parameters











θ T = γ(1 + λ)+αλπ Θ = λπ
P =( 1− α)+αλω
θ Q = αλω
θ + ιN = λη
where:
γ = 1−α







(1+αλ)δ+λ(1−α) ξ = α +
(1−ε)(1−α)
ν η = ω
θ − κ
ρ =( 1− δ)γω =
(1−ε)(1−α)





θ − ρζ =1− 1−ε
ν
∆ = φ −
ξ
θ ψ = δ
1−α+αδ
clearly expressed, those reduced forms are summarized as
n
h =[ Λ − Φβ]m
h + Φβm




f =[ Λ − Φ(1 − β)]m
f +Φ(1−β)m




h =[ A + Eβ]m
h − Eβm




f =[ A + E(1 − β)]m
f −E(1−β)m
h +[ P − T(1 − β)]τ
f +T(1 −β)τ
h +Σx (17)
where the capital Greek letters A, E, Λ, Φ, Σ and H are a group of positive non-
structural parameters of the model deﬁn e di nT a b l e2 .
In addition to shocks, employment and inﬂation in both economies are aﬀected
by inter- and intra-economy policy spillovers. For both economies, regardless of their
size, an increase of their own money supply raises domestic inﬂation and employ-
ment, while an expansion of its neighbour’s money supply decreases domestic inﬂa-
tion and raises employment. An increase in domestic taxation raises inﬂa t i o ni nb o t h
economies, causes domestic job losses and increases employment abroad. Meanwhile,
the supply shock triggers unemployment and raises inﬂation in both economies.
Observing the eﬀect of size asymmetries on these reduced forms, notice that when
β =1t h em o n e t a r ya n dﬁscal authorities in the trivially small home economy are
incapable of aﬀecting the large foreign economy employment and inﬂation through
changes in their monetary or ﬁscal stances. Meanwhile, when both economies are
size symmetric (i.e. β = 1
2), they both aﬀect each other equally.
113.3.2 Monetary union
We consider now the case in which the home and foreign economies decide to con-
stitute a monetary union. In this scenario, the nominal exchange rate disappears
and the real exchange rate is simply determined by relative prices (i.e. e =0a n d
z = pf − ph). Monetary policy is controlled by a single central bank that issues a
single currency; hence, changes in the money supply are identical in both economies.
Taking this into consideration, the reduced forms for employment and inﬂation when
the two economies take part in a monetary union are simply given by 6
n
f = Λm
u − [Ω + N(1 − β)]τ




u − [Ω + Nβ]τ
h + Nβτ
f − Hx (18)
q
f = Am
u +[ P − Q(1 − β)]τ




u +[ P − Qβ]τ
h + Qβτ
f + Σx (19)
where mu is the money supply in the union and N and Q are positive non-structural
parameters deﬁned in Table 2. Notice how under this regime the two economies
are equally aﬀected by the central authority’s monetary policy. An increase in the
taxation of revenues by any of the two governments raises inﬂa t i o ni nb o t he c o n o m i e s ,
generates domestic job losses and increases employment abroad. Meanwhile, the
supply shock reduces employment and increases inﬂa t i o ni nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o na n d
proportion than under ﬂexible regimes.
3.4 Inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀs
Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) show that under non-cooperative regimes, size asym-
metries give rise to diﬀerent inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀs for policymakers.7 In
general, they show that authorities in relatively smaller economies face more favourable
employment-inﬂation trade-oﬀs than those confronted by relatively larger economies.
For instance, for the reduced forms presented in (16) and (17), the trade-oﬀ faced





2; see Appendix B.1 for proof). The advantage of having a steeper
inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀ for the small economy is illustrated graphically in
Figure 1. As can be observed, a larger positive trade-oﬀ allows the central bank
in the small home economy to exchange a large (given) inﬂation reduction for a
smaller employment loss. Hence, if–as we assume later–central banks care more
about inﬂation than about employment (i.e. σ1 < 1), a steeper trade-oﬀ is also more
6These reduced forms are also fully derived in Appendix A.2.
7Utilizing a three-country version of this model, Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) study the de-
terminants of policy trade-oﬀs and incentives for central banks and governments in the US and
Europe. In their analysis, they consider the speciﬁc case of policy coordination between the US and
an EMU that consists of two equal size economies.












advantageous for the small home economy.
A similar situation arises in the case of ﬁscal authorities. For the reduced forms
presented in (16) and (17), the trade-oﬀ faced by the government in the home econ-
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B.2 for proof). As shown in Figure 2, the small economy ﬁscal authority is capa-
ble of exchanging a higher (given) employment gain for a small price stability loss.
Considering that ﬁscal authorities are more concerned about employment than about
inﬂation, a negative ﬂatter inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀ allows the government of
the home economy to hold a more favourable position regardless of the exchange rate
regime considered.
Nevertheless, cooperation between the two economies’ monetary and ﬁscal author-
ities eliminates the advantage of possessing a more favourable trade-oﬀ.E m p l o y i n g
the reduced forms for the monetary union regime presented in (18) and (19), it is
straightforward to show that once the home economy takes part in the monetary
union, the inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀ faced by the central monetary authority
is one and the same for both economies. Irrespective of the size of the countries
involved, the centralization of monetary policy decisions provides the same inﬂation—
employment trade-oﬀ for both economies.
The elimination of their more favourable inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀ will have
an inﬂuence over the ability of the home policymakers to react to shocks. In what
follows, we ﬁrst observe how relinquishing monetary policy independence–with and











without ﬁscal policy considerations–aﬀect the macroeconomic stability of a small
economy. Then, we examine how alternative schemes of ﬁscal cooperation can help
to ameliorate the stabilization costs endured by the small economy that decides to
take part in a monetary union.
4 Assessing a monetary union regime without ﬁs-
cal policy considerations
The purpose of this section is twofold. The ﬁrst is to draw attention to the relevance
of size asymmetries for macroeconomic policymaking. The second is to set a point of
reference to analyse the role of ﬁscal policy on macroeconomic stabilization that we
carry out in the next section.
The starting point in this analysis is a situation where both economies have their
own currency and policymaking is only delegated to central banks whose main objec-
tive is to achieve price stability. This forms the benchmark with which we assess the
decision of taking part in a monetary union. As in early studies exploring this issue
(see for instance Martin, 1995; Lane, 1996, 2000; Rantala, 2001), in this section ﬁscal
authorities are excluded from the analysis. In order to do so, we simply eliminate
the taxation of revenues and the eﬀect of government spending from the equations in
the general framework of the model (i.e. equations (2), (4) and (11)). The resulting
14reduced forms under both regimes are identical to those in (16) to (19) setting τj for
j = h,f equal to zero.
To illustrate the importance of size asymmetries on stabilization policies, we ob-
serve the policymaking process under two diﬀerent states of the world. In the ﬁrst, we
examine the constitution of a monetary union between two equal size economies. In
the second, we consider the case of a small economy forming a monetary union with
a considerably larger economy or region (e.g. an already formed monetary union).
Employing the reduced forms in (16) to (19) and the central banks preferences
in (12) and (13), we solve the policy game under the two regimes considered assign-
ing numerical values to the structural parameters of the model and computing the
resulting equilibrium. The parameter values employed to solve the model are given
by α =0 .34, δ =0 .7, λ =0 .34, υ =0 .4,ε=0 .65, and σ1 =0 .2. These structural
parameters are not assigned arbitrarily; they are justiﬁe db a s e do ne m p i r i c a le v i -
dence or are set to reﬂect the expected environment faced by policymakers. A value
of α =0 .34 implies that from the original Cobb—Douglas production function where
capital is constant and normalized to unity, labour requires two-thirds of the total
inputs.8 Ac h o i c eo fδ =0 .7 intends to reﬂect a high sensitivity of trade to variations
in the real exchange rate.9 λ =0 .34 is the mean value of the elasticity of the money
demand with respect to the interest rate found by Knell and Stix (2003) in a survey
of 500 individual money demand estimations. The values of ε =0 .65 is about the
average of the marginal propensity to consume found by Osada (1999) for a group of
12 industrial and developing economies. The parameter v =0 .4 is the same employed
by Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) in a numerical
estimation of a similar model.10 Finally, assuming that σ1 =0 .2 realistically implies
that the central banks cares more about inﬂa t i o nt h a na b o u te m p l o y m e n t .
For the two alternative states of the world, we consider the values of β =0 .5a n d
β =0 .9. The ﬁrst parameter value refers to the scenario in which the two economies
are size symmetric, while the second correspond to a state of the world in which the
home economy is only one-tenth of the size of the large foreign economy.
Flexible exchange rate regime In the absence of ﬁscal policy considerations,
the central banks are the sole authorities responsible for dealing with stabilization
in the event that disturbances aﬀect their economies. Under ﬂexible exchange rates,
individual central banks respond by contracting their money supplies to ﬁght the in-
ﬂationary pressure provoked by the supply shock; a strategy that produces a negative
externality on their neighbour via the real exchange rate. For instance, a decrease in
8This proportion is consistently employed in diﬀerent macroeconomic models calibration (see for
instance Cooley and Prescott, 1996; Kiley, 2004; Andres et al., 2004).
9This parameter value is consistent with empirical evidence testing the Marshall—Lerner condition
which suggests that elasticity of the demand with respect to imports and exports is usually below
unity.
10More details about the numerical reduced forms associated with this parameter value are pre-
sented in the following section.
15Table 3: Welfare evaluations without ﬁscal authorities
A. Symmetric size economies (β =0 .5)






f -1.685 0.427 -2.170 0.790 0.375 -1.077 0.634 -1.371 0.340 0.317
h -1.685 0.427 -2.170 0.790 0.375 -1.077 0.634 -1.371 0.340 0.317
B. Asymmetric size economies (β =0 .9)






f -1.268 0.594 -1.618 0.427 0.337 -1.077 0.634 -1.371 0.340 0.317
h -1.528 0.260 -1.992 1.180 0.267 -1.077 0.634 -1.371 0.340 0.317
the money supply of the home economy will appreciate the exchange rate and then
increase inﬂation on the foreign economy.
Under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime, both central bankers play Nash against
each other and minimize their loss function in (12) taking the money supply of their
neighbour as given. The solution to the minimization problem of both central bankers





∂mj = 0 for j = h,f (20)
Solving the resulting two equations for mh and mf simultaneously, we obtain the equi-
librium money supplies for both economies. Substituting those equilibrium money
supplies on the employment and inﬂation reduced forms presented in (16) and (17),
and then the resulting expressions on the loss functions of the monetary authorities,
we obtain the ﬂexible exchange rate equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 3 for
both states of the world (β =0 .5a n dβ =0 .9).
Monetary union regime By adopting a common currency the members of a
monetary union loose control over their own money supply. When a symmetric
supply shock aﬀects them, a central monetary authority that minimizes the weighted
average of the two economies losses contracts the world money supply to restore price
stability in the union.
Considering that mj = mu for j = h, f, we obtain the equilibrium money supply
set by the central monetary authority by minimizing the loss function deﬁn e di n( 1 3 ) .

















=0 ( 2 1 )
Solving this equation for mu, plugging the resulting equilibria in (18) and (19), and
16subsequently the expressions obtained on the loss functions of the individual monetary
authorities, we arrive at the monetary union regime equilibrium outcomes shown in
Table 3.
We ﬁrst contrast the equilibrium outcomes for the two regimes in the state of
the world in which a currency union is formed between two equal size economies
(i.e. β =0 .5). As can be observed in Table 3 Panel A, when the two economies
a r es i z es y m m e t r i ct h ei n ﬂation—employment trade-oﬀs (i.e.
∂qj
∂nj) faced by them in
each regime are identical. Under this state of the world, gains from participating
in a monetary union for both economies stem from ameliorating the externalities
that each economy exerts on its neighbour through the real exchange rate. After
adopting a common currency, the central monetary authority contracts the world
money supply less aggressively than the individual policymakers. By reducing the
employment losses of the two economies without increasing inﬂation substantially,
adopting a common currency ultimately allows a better position for both economies
in terms of the losses they endure.
The implications of the analysis change when we compare a state of the world
in which a monetary union is constituted between economies that diﬀer in size (i.e.
β =0 .9). As we observed earlier, under a non-cooperative regime the asymmetries
in the size of the economies give rise to dissimilar inﬂation—employment trade-oﬀs
which are more favourable for a relatively smaller economy.
As shown in Table 3 panel B, while both economies continue attaining the same
trade-oﬀ participating in a monetary union, the small economy faces a (steeper) more
advantageous trade-oﬀ than the large economy policymaker when it operates under
a ﬂexible regime. Due to its steeper trade-oﬀ, the small home economy policymaker
is capable of responding more eﬀectively to the supply shock. As a result, the home
money supply is contracted more aggressively, shifting the inﬂation burden arising
from the shock to the foreign economy and reducing domestic inﬂation more eﬀec-
tively.
Assessing the decision faced by the policymaker in the small economy about taking
part in a monetary union, we observe that by abandoning the ﬂexible regime his
economy experiences considerably higher losses. Clearly, the small home economy
would be better oﬀ “free riding” from its size–by using its own monetary policy–to
counteract the inﬂationary pressure provoked by the supply shock.11
5 A monetary union with ﬁscal authorities
As in early models evaluating the desirability of forming a currency union, in the
previous section we assumed that monetary authorities were the only policymakers
concerned with output and price stability. Nevertheless, to better assess the deci-
sion faced by small economies, we need to consider that the coexistence of ﬁscal
11As pointed out earlier, similar results were found by Martin (1995) studying the incentives of
small open economies to join an already formed monetary union.
17and monetary authorities generates additional interactions and spillovers in the pol-
icymaking process. As we observe later on, these interactions inﬂuence the way in
which stabilization policies aﬀect the members of a monetary union and the way that
policymakers respond to each other’s strategic decisions.
In order to incorporate the role of government policies on macroeconomic stabi-
lization, in this section we introduce into the model benevolent ﬁscal authorities that
maximize the welfare of their residents and care not just about inﬂation and employ-
ment, but also about taxation and exchange rate volatility. Following the inclusion
of ﬁscal authorities, we begin by reconsidering the feasibility of forming a monetary
union between a small and a large economy. Once the convenience of participating
in a monetary union has been reassessed in the presence of non-cooperative ﬁscal
stances, we focus our attention on the viability of engaging both economies in ﬁscal
coordination and on how diﬀerent schemes of policy synchronization can provide the
grounds for beneﬁcial cooperation among the members of a monetary union. We
evaluate three diﬀerent schemes of ﬁscal coordination: simple cooperation between
ﬁscal authorities (playing Nash against the central monetary authority), monetary
and ﬁscal leadership strategies.
5.1 Reassessing participation in a monetary union
From now on, we concentrate on the asymmetric state of the world (i.e. the case when
β =0 .9). The timing of events is similar to that described earlier in the absence of
ﬁscal policy considerations. At period t − 1, trade unions form expectations and set
wages accordingly. Thereafter, at period t,t h es h o c kx is realized and observed by
monetary and ﬁscal authorities in both economies. Following this, under the ﬂexible
exchange rate regime the four authorities chose their instruments simultaneously
taking the actions of the other policymakers as given. The exchange rate is then
endogenously determined according to the responses of the four policymakers to the





h)( 2 2 )
where φ and ρ are deﬁned in Table 2. Given the forms of the respective preferences
of monetary and ﬁscal authorities described in (12) and (14), monetary authorities
reduce their money supplies to ameliorate the inﬂation pressure provoked by the shock
and ﬁscal authorities decrease taxation to counteract the reduction in employment.
As a result, the actions of monetary and ﬁscal authorities have opposite eﬀects over
the nominal exchange rate. For instance, when–in response to a supply shock–
the home monetary authority reduces its money supply (by more than the foreign
central bank thanks to its steeper trade-oﬀ), this appreciates the nominal exchange
rate. Meanwhile, the reduction in taxation by the home ﬁscal authority (above the
foreign ﬁscal authority) reduces the extent of the appreciation and brings the nominal
exchange rate back towards its original level.











In the presence of ﬁscal policy considerations, monetary authorities continue min-
imizing the loss function described by equation (12). Meanwhile, ﬁscal authorities
minimize the deviations of employment, inﬂation, taxes and the nominal exchange
rate from zero, as shown in equation (14). The preferences of the ﬁscal authorities,
under ﬂexible exchange rates feature the values of σ21 =0 .06, σ22 =0 .6, and σ3 =0 .9.
Numerically, these values provide the following loss functions:
L
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In order to make the ﬁscal authorities’ preferences consistent with the size of the
two economies and their integration towards each other, we assume that the small
economy cares ten times more about the volatility of the exchange rate than the
large economy. Its higher dislike for variations of the exchange rate increases the
activism of the government on managing ﬁscal policy (i.e. reduces the home ﬁscal
authority dislike for taxation volatility). Finally, both policymakers care more about
employment than about inﬂation.
Under the monetary union regime, the adoption of a common currency eliminates
the exchange rate volatility concern from the ﬁscal authorities loss functions. As a
result, the preferences of the ﬁscal authorities are described by (15). Numerically,
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In the absence of exchange rate volatility, the activism of two authorities is reduced
and they continue caring more about employment than about inﬂation. Meanwhile,
the central monetary authority minimizes the weighted sum of both central bank
losses as described in equation (13).
Using the structural parameters values deﬁned above (α =0 .34, δ =0 .7, λ =0 .34,
υ =0 .4a n dε =0 .65), the reduced forms under ﬂexible exchange rates (in (16) and
19Table 5: Welfare evaluations with ﬁscal authorities
A. Flexible exchange rate regime Trade-oﬀs(
∂qj
∂nj) Losses
Econ n q m τ e CB FA LCB LFA
f -0.775 0.363 -1.090 -0.345 -0.283 0.427 -1.937 0.128 0.335
h -0.473 0.080 -1.555 -1.016 -0.283 1.180 -0.571 0.025 0.331
B. Monetary union without ﬁscal coordination Trade-oﬀs(
∂qj
∂nj) Losses
Econ n q m τ e CB FA LCB LFA
f -0.683 0.401 -1.020 -0.360 - 0.340 -1.935 0.126 0.150
h -0.531 0.329 -1.020 -0.527 - 0.340 -0.551 0.082 0.135
(17)) and the monetary union regime (in (18) and (19)) are numerically presented
in Table 4. As expected, foreign instruments have a considerable higher impact on
home employment and inﬂa t i o nt h a nh o m ei n s t r u m e n t so nf o r e i g nv a r i a b l e s . O n l y
when a monetary union is constituted, the impact of the union money supply is the
same in both economies employment and inﬂation.
Flexible exchange rate regime Employing the loss functions in (23), under the

















∂τh =0 ( 2 6 )
Meanwhile, central banks continue facing the FOCs deﬁned in (20). Plugging the
numerical reduced forms in Table 4 on the FOCs in (20) and (26), and solving simul-
taneously for mj and τj, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 5
panel A.
Contrasting the equilibrium outcomes for the ﬂexible exchange rate regimes in Ta-
bles 2 (panel B) and 5 (panel A), the ﬁrst thing to notice is how both central bankers
operating under ﬂexible exchange rate regimes are better oﬀ once ﬁscal authorities
exert their own eﬀort towards stabilization. Following the inﬂation and unemploy-
ment tolls yielded by the shock, the actions of the ﬁscal policymakers produce a
positive externality on the central bankers. This happens because the contraction of
taxes–and hence government spending–by the ﬁscal authorities reduces inﬂation.
Nonetheless, this positive externality does not extend to the actions of the central
bankers. Following the supply shock, the tightening of the central banks money
supplies reduces the level of employment in conjunction with the shock. Hence, the
stabilization eﬀorts of the central bankers produce a negative externality on the ﬁscal
authorities that care more about employment than about inﬂation.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes for the two economies under ﬂexible ex-
20change rates in Table 5, we observe how the ﬂatter inﬂation employment trade-oﬀ
faced by the small economy ﬁscal authority allows it to (contract taxes more ag-
gressively and) experience lower unemployment. Similarly, as a result of his steeper
trade-oﬀ, the central banker in the small economy (contract its money supply by more
than its counterpart and) experiences less inﬂation.12 The combination of lower in-
ﬂation and unemployment results in considerable lower losses for the small economy
central banker. On the other hand, despite its more favourable trade-oﬀ,t h ea c t i v i s m
required to reduce unemployment (i.e. a larger contraction of τh)a n di t sh i g h e rc o n -
cern for the volatility of the exchange rate, lead the ﬁscal authority in the small
economy to endure similar losses than its counterpart in the large economy.
Monetary union regime Under this arrangement, the ﬁscal authorities’ mini-
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Solving the FOCs in (27) and (28) simultaneously for mu and τj, we obtain the
equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 5 panel B.
Looking at the desirability of taking part in the monetary, we observe that giving
up monetary policy implies the small economy abandoning its ability to exploit the
exchange rate to react to the shock (i.e. giving up its more favourable trade-oﬀ).
As a result, the small economy experiences more inﬂation than under the ﬂexible
regime. In terms of employment, the ﬁscal authority retains its ﬂatter trade-oﬀ and
endures fewer job losses than its counterpart after the formation of the monetary
union. However, the lower contraction of the central authority money supply and
the higher concern of the ﬁscal authorities for the taxation of revenues (i.e. its lower
activism in ﬁscal policy once the exchange rate volatility is eliminated) produce a
less aggressive reaction from the small economy ﬁscal authority. As a result, both
unemployment and inﬂation are larger for the small economy under the monetary
union than under the ﬂexible regime. This results in considerable larger losses from
the monetary authority’s perspective.
Nevertheless, participating in the monetary union allows the small economy’s
ﬁscal authority to reduce the social welfare losses arising after the shock. There
are two explanations for this result. The ﬁrst is that under the monetary union
regime the exchange rate volatility disappears and that eliminates the level of losses
12The trade-oﬀs faced by monetary authorities are obviously the same than those presented before
for the analysis of stabilization policies without ﬁscal authorities.
21suﬀered by its society in terms of transaction costs and uncertainty. The second has
to do with the reduction in the volatility of taxation. Although the small economy
experiences higher inﬂation and unemployment participating in the monetary union
than operating under a ﬂexible regime, the less aggressive response of the central
monetary authority and the absence of exchange rate volatility concerns challenge a
lower restraining of taxes from the ﬁscal authority. This reduces the welfare losses
associated with a fall in taxation of revenues and government spending.
Despite the lower social welfare losses arising under the monetary union regime, in-
ﬂation and employment are larger than under the non-cooperative regime. In episodes
of prolonged instability, this of course would be a cause for concern for monetary and
ﬁscal authorities. Particular discomfort may arise in the foreign large economy, as
it endures more inﬂation and unemployment that the small economy. In what fol-
lows, we explore whether ﬁscal coordination can help to ameliorate the inﬂation and
unemployment experienced by the members of the monetary union.
5.2 Fiscal coordination
The treaty establishing the European Union provides some room for ﬁscal coordi-
nation by suggesting that “Member states shall regard their economic policy as a
matter of common concern and shall coordinate them within the (European) Coun-
cil”.13 Nevertheless, up until now, coordination in the EU has not involved explicit
schemes of cooperation between ﬁscal authorities at the Economic and Finance Coun-
cil (ECOFIN) level or a full formal agreement between the ECB and the ECOFIN
Council.
Although coordination among authorities thus far has been rather limited to the
commitment towards the rules imposed by the SGP and the mutual attendance of
ECB and ECOFIN representatives at each other’s Council meetings, the interaction of
monetary and ﬁscal policy remains an increasingly crucial issue for the EU; especially
as the monetary union prepares to embrace additional members. Indeed, bringing
together the presence of a supranational monetary authority and coordinated ﬁscal
agents is an interesting research topic relevant for the future design of Europe’s ﬁscal
and monetary institutions.
In this section we explore a simple scheme of cooperation in which ﬁscal authorities
in both economies are coordinated by a central ﬁscal authority but no involvement
of the monetary authority exists (i.e. ﬁscal authorities cooperate against the central
monetary authority). In other words, monetary and ﬁscal central authorities play
Nash against each other. While the monetary authority chooses the money supply
of the union, the ﬁscal authority sets the rate for the taxation of revenues.
Under ﬁscal cooperation, the central authority that coordinates ﬁscal policymak-
ing in the monetary union minimizes the weighted sum of the two ﬁscal authorities’
13Extract from the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 99 (European Council, 1997).
22Table 6: Welfare evaluation for alternative forms of coordination
A. Monetary union with ﬁscal coordination Losses
Economy n q m τ e LCB LFA
f -0.714 0.420 -1.059 -0.338 - 0.140 0.157
h -0.714 0.420 -1.059 -0.338 - 0.140 0.157
B. Monetary authority Stackelberg leader Losses
Economy n q m τ e LCB LFA
f -0.928 0.275 -1.377 -0.410 - 0.124 0.254
h -0.928 0.275 -1.377 -0.410 - 0.124 0.254
C. Fiscal authority Stackelberg leader Losses
Economy n q m τ e LCB LFA
f -0.463 0.272 -0.845 -0.570 - 0.059 0.128
h -0.463 0.272 -0.845 -0.570 - 0.059 0.128
loss functions:





with respect to the ﬁscal authority instruments τf and τh. The corresponding FOCs








































Substituting the numerical reduced forms for the monetary union regime presented
in Table 4 and solving the system of three equation involving (28) and (30), the
resulting equilibrium outcomes for the regime are presented in Table 6 panel A.14
As in the case of monetary uniﬁcation (without ﬁscal cooperation), coordination
of ﬁscal policies leads to a less aggressive response of the central ﬁscal authority
to the shock. This happens because centralization of ﬁscal stances allows the ﬁscal
authorities to internalize (and eliminate) the negative external eﬀects that a larger
contraction of taxes by both economies has on each other’s employment. However,
this less signiﬁcant contraction by the ﬁscal authority translates into a smaller positive
externality on price stability. Consequently, the central monetary authority responds
more aggressively to the shock than in the absence of ﬁscal coordination.
For the two economies involved in the regime, the more aggressive reaction of the
central monetary authority to the shock and the weaker response of the central ﬁscal
authority lead to higher inﬂation and unemployment than in the absence of ﬁscal
14Assuming that the central ﬁscal authority harmonizes the taxation of revenues in the two
economies (i.e. that τ = τ1 = τ2) and that it minimizes the weighted sum of the two ﬁscal
authorities loss function as in (29) provides exactly the same result.
23coordination. As a result, despite the lower activism of ﬁscal policy (i.e. the lower
contraction of taxes than under no coordination), both economies experience higher
losses from a monetary or ﬁscal perspective. Hence, centralization of ﬁscal policies
results in a counterproductive strategy for the members of the monetary union.
In order to control for the more aggressive reaction of the central monetary au-
thority and the weaker response of the central ﬁscal authority, coordination can be
extended to harmonize the stabilization eﬀorts of both policymakers. In what follows,
we examine schemes of coordination comprising the ﬁscal and the monetary central
authorities committed to follow the stabilization eﬀorts of each other.
5.3 Monetary and ﬁscal policy coordination
Since ﬁscal policy centralization against the monetary authority results in a counter-
productive strategy for the members of a monetary union, in this section we explore
forms of international coordination that involve synchronizing the stabilization ef-
fort of both, ﬁscal and monetary central authorities. We present the solution for
two alternative arrangements. In the ﬁrst, the central monetary authority acts as
Stackelberg leader, while in the second the ﬁscal authority acts as such. Under both
arrangements, the authority that acts as leader minimizes its own losses taking into
account the reaction of the other player.15
Monetary leadership First, we consider the case where, following the supply
shock, the central monetary authority chooses the money supply for the union taking
into account the response of the central ﬁscal authority to its actions. In this case,
the monetary authority’s problem is to
min LMU = βL
f
CB +( 1− β)L
h
CB
s.t. : FOCs in (30) (31)
Employing the reduced forms in Table 4, the resulting equilibrium for the monetary
leadership regime are presented in Table 6 panel B.
The more signiﬁcant is the monetary authority reaction to the disturbance, the
more aggressively the ﬁscal authority responds after the shock. This is because a
greater contraction of the money supply triggers more unemployment which the ﬁs-
cal authority tries to ameliorate by cutting taxes. This, of course, creates a larger
positive externality for the central monetary authority. Hence, the latter takes advan-
tage of its leadership to contract its money supply more aggressively than in previous
regimes. As a result, it is capable of achieving lower inﬂation and losses than under no
cooperation with the central ﬁscal authority. Nonetheless, due to the more aggressive
reaction by both authorities, unemployment and taxation volatility increase consid-
erably; as a result, social welfare losses signiﬁcantly exceed those under the previous
15For some insight into the implementation of ﬁscal coordination schemes like those we have
proposed see, for instance, Fatas et al. (2003) and von Hagen (2004).
24regimes (i.e. monetary union without ﬁscal cooperation or pure coordination of ﬁscal
authorities playing Nash against the central bank). In the end, cooperation under
monetary leadership is counterproductive for the ﬁscal authorities and the societies
they represent.
Fiscal leadership When the ﬁscal authority acts as leader and the monetary au-
thority performs as follower, the optimization problem of the former is deﬁned as
follows:





s.t. : FOCs in (28) (32)
The equilibrium outcomes for this arrangement when employing the numerical re-
duced forms presented in Table 4 are shown in Table 6 panel C.
Comparing the outcomes in Table 6 panels B and C with those in panel A, it
is apparent that whoever has the ﬁrst mover advantage determines the equilibrium
r a n k i n go fi n ﬂation, employment and welfare for the two authorities. In the event that
the ﬁscal authority acts as Stackelberg leader, it also uses its ﬁrst mover advantage to
reduce unemployment more actively than in the absence of coordination. It realizes
that–despite its aversion for the volatility of taxation–a more contractionary ﬁscal
policy conveys a positive externality over the monetary authority which responds
tightening its money supply less aggressively after the shock. Hence, by challenging
a lower money supply contraction from the central monetary authority, the ﬁscal au-
thority also achieves considerably lower employment losses. The combination of lower
inﬂation and unemployment with a moderate cutback in taxes leads to a reduction
on the losses experienced by monetary and ﬁscal authorities. As a result, the ﬁscal
leadership strategy brings a Pareto gain from the perspective of all the policymakers
involved and the societies they represent.
Ranking the social welfare losses experienced by both economies over all the ar-
rangements examined, it is clear that the ﬁscal leadership strategy makes engaging in
monetary and ﬁscal coordination attractive for the residents of both economies and
their authorities. Fiscal leadership is preferred by policymakers to a monetary union
where ﬁscal authorities play Nash against the central monetary authority and to a
monetary leadership regime. Moreover, the ﬁscal leadership regime is superior to a
fully non-cooperative equilibrium in which both countries have their own currency
and possess their own ﬁscal policy.
In terms of feasibility, whether a ﬁscal leadership regime can be a realistic option
f o rE M Uw o u l dd e p e n do nt h ec o m m i t m e n to fﬁscal and monetary authorities to
achieving eﬀective coordination. Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) suggest that look-
ing at the ﬁscal authority as the leader is naturally embedded in the institutional
policymaking process. This happens because in practice ﬁscal policy is set prior to
monetary policy and revised much less frequently. Typically, ﬁscal policy is deﬁned
on an annual basis, whereas monetary policy is constantly monitored and may change
25several times over the course of a year. These circumstances point towards the ﬁscal
authority as the natural ﬁrst mover (i.e. the Stackelberg leader), a situation that in
our model is indeed desirable for policymakers and the residents of both economies.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this chapter has been to assess the desirability of taking part in a monetary
union from the perspective of a small open economy. In particular, the analysis
intends to shed some light on the potential participation of the EU’s new members
in the EMU.
The chapter addresses two important questions. The ﬁrst is whether participation
in a monetary union is desirable for a small open economy. We ﬁnd that, leaving
ﬁscal policy considerations aside, it is straightforward to conclude that participation
in a monetary union is counterproductive for a small economy. The key point to
this result is that a small open economy is better oﬀ “free riding”, and using its own
monetary policy to counteract the inﬂationary pressures provoked by supply shocks.
Following this result, we expand the analysis to consider the interactions between
ﬁscal and monetary authorities on macroeconomic stabilization. We ﬁnd that, once
representative ﬁscal policymakers are incorporated into the model, taking part in
the monetary union becomes desirable from a social welfare perspective. The rea-
son for this is that, by taking part in stabilization ﬁscal authorities concerned about
employment respond to the shock reducing taxes and spending, oﬀsetting with this in-
ﬂationary pressures and ameliorating unemployment. In addition, under a monetary
union regime, the absence of exchange rate volatility and the reduction in taxation
are both factors that contribute to decreasing the losses that society experiences in
t h ef a c eo ft h es h o c k .
The second question this chapter explores is whether monetary and ﬁscal coordi-
nation can help to improve the macroeconomic stability of the members of a monetary
union. Evaluating three alternative forms of cooperation, it is shown that the pure co-
ordination of ﬁscal authorities (playing Nash against the central monetary authority)
results in a counterproductive strategy for both economies. Harmonizing the inter-
action between ﬁscal and monetary authorities, it is found that while a monetary
leadership strategy results in a deterioration of the small economy ﬁscal authority’s
position, a ﬁscal leadership strategy leads to a Pareto improvement from the perspec-
tive of both economic authorities and the societies they represent. With respect to
the latter ﬁnding, we concur with other papers in the literature in suggesting that,
given the timing required to implement and change monetary and ﬁscal policies, a
ﬁscal leadership strategy is not only the most eﬃcient coordination solution but also
t h em o s tf e a s i b l eo n e .
Clearly, our model leaves aside many issues potentially relevant for small open
economies facing the decision of participating in a monetary union. First, although
we try to set asymmetric structures, our model assumes, for instance, that the pro-
26ductivity of labour in the two economies is the same. Integration could potentially
create this eﬀect but in the short term this may not be the case. Second, we assume a
balanced budget constraint for the two economies. Indeed the SGP aims at “balanced
budget or in surplus in the medium term” but this hardly means that debt should be
excluded from the analysis in the short term.16 A tl e a s ti nt h es h o r tr u n ,d e b ts u s t a i n -
ability deserves more attention. Finally, this paper does not address the mechanism
through which the schemes of coordination examined here could be implemented.
Clearly, the commitment of ﬁscal and monetary policymakers is necessary in order to
achieve eﬀective cooperative solutions like the ones we have proposed. However, the
necessary agreements and mechanisms to achieve coordination are beyond the scope
of this paper.
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29Appendices
A. Derivation of the reduced forms of the model
A.1 Flexible exchange rates
We start by obtaining the reduced forms for the ﬂexible regime. Utilizing (8) and










j + x (A.2)
Substituting the employment semi-reduced form into (A.2) we obtain that
p
j = αm
j +( 1− α)τ
j + λi
j + x (A.3)
The derivation of the real exchange rate reduced form requires several steps. Using





Solving z for e and substituting (A.3) into the resulting expression, the nominal
















Now, subtracting home supply and demand in (1) and (4) from those same expressions
for the foreign economy, we obtain that
y
f − y
h =( 1− α)(n
f − n
h)( A . 6 )
y
f − y
h = −δz (A.7)
Substituting the employment semi-reduced form in (A.1) into (A.6) and plugging
equation (A.5) into (A.7), equalizing the two expressions and solving for z,t h er e -












where Γ = 1−α
(1+αλ)δ+(1−α)λ. To obtain the nominal exchange rate reduced form, simply
















(1+αλ)δ+(1−α)λ and ρ =( 1− δ)Γ.
Now, we need to obtain the interest rate reduced forms. Using (5) and assuming





Since real exchange movement cancel each other around the world and shocks are




w +( 1− α)τ
w +( 1+αλ)i
w + x (A.11)
World demand is given by the weighted sum of the demands in the two economies.
Using (4), the world demand is equal to
y
w = βy
















On the other hand, using (1) and (8), the world supply can be written as
y
w =( 1− α)n
w − x =( 1− α)[m
w − τ
w + λi
w] − x (A.14)
Substituting the above expression on (A.13), it follows that
r
w = −













Equalizing (A.11) and (A.15) and solving for iw we obtain
i
w = βi













where ξ = α +
(1−ε)(1−α)
ν , θ =1+αλ +
(1−ε)(1−α)λ
υ , ω = 1
v +
(1−ε)(1−α)
ν − (1 − α)a n d
ζ =1− 1−ε
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where ∆ = φ −
ξ
θ and π = ω
θ − ρ.
Finally, we employ the domestic prices (A.3), interest rates (A.18) and real ex-
change rate in (A.8) to obtain the employment and inﬂation reduced forms under a
ﬂexible regime presented in (16) and (17).
A.2 Monetary union regime
Following the adoption of a common currency, money supply in the union is
controlled by the central monetary authority. Since there are only two countries,
the central monetary authority has full command over the world money supply (i.e.
mu = mw). The nominal exchange rate disappears once the two economies employ a
single currency, hence the real exchange rate becomes simple z = pf − ph.
Plugging the equations for the price semi-reduced form deﬁn e di n( A . 2 )o nz,






[z +( 1− α)e τ]( A . 1 9 )
Equalizing (A.7) and (A.6), substituting (A.19) and solving for z we obtain the real
exchange rate reduced form
z = ι(τ
f − τ
h)( A . 2 0 )
where ι =
(1−α)





h)( A . 2 1 )
where κ =
(1−α)(1−δ)
(1−α+αδ)λ. Combining equations (A.21) and (A.16), the interest rate re-
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Finally, we employ the domestic prices (A.3), interest rates (A.22) and real exchange
rate in (A.20) to obtain the employment and inﬂation reduced forms under the mon-
etary union presented in (18) and (19).
32B. Trade-oﬀ proofs
B.1 Proof that a smaller economy monetary authority faces a steeper
trade-oﬀ


















A + E(1 − β)
Λ − Φ(1 − β)
(B.1)




A + E(1 − β)
Λ − Φ(1 − β)
(B.2)
Cross multiplying both sides we obtain that this requires
AΦ[β − (1 − β)] > −ΛE [β − (1 − β)] (B.3)
Providing that the capital Greek letters are positive, this inequality holds if β>
(1 − β). That is, whenever the home economy is relatively smaller than the foreign.
Intuitively, the smaller home economy consumes a larger proportion of its goods
from the foreign. Therefore, a contraction of its money supply, which appreciates the
exchange rate produces a larger reduction of its CPI.
B.2 Proof that a smaller economy ﬁscal authority faces a ﬂatter trade-
oﬀ


















P − T(1 − β)
Ω + Θ(1 − β)
(B.4)
The statement that a small home economy faces a steeper trade-oﬀ implies that
−[P − Tβ][Ω + Θ(1 − β)] > −[P − T(1 − β)][Ω + Θβ]( B . 5 )
Simplifying this expression shows that the domestic economy has a ﬂatter trade-oﬀ
when β>(1 − β). A similar proof can be derived by employing the reduced forms
for the monetary union regime.
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